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During 2008 to 2013, 215 outbreak alerts, also known 
as ‘urgent inquiries’ (UI), for food- and waterborne dis-
eases were launched in Europe, the majority of them 
(135; 63%) being related to salmonellosis. For 110 (51%) 
UI, a potential food vehicle of infection was identified, 
with vegetables being the most reported category (34; 
31%). A total of 28% (n = 60) of the outbreaks reported 
had an international dimension, involving at least 
two countries (mean: 4; standard deviation: 2; range: 
2–14). Participating countries posted 2,343 messages 
(initial posts and replies, excluding updates), with 
a median of 11 messages per urgent inquiry (range: 
1–28). Of 60 multicountry UI, 50 involved between two 
and four countries. The UI allowed early detection of 
multicountry outbreaks, facilitated the identification 
of the suspected vehicles and consequently contrib-
uted to the timely implementation of control meas-
ures. The introduction of an epidemic intelligence 
information system platform in 2010 has strengthened 
the role of the Food- and Waterborne Diseases and 
Zoonoses network in facilitating timely exchange of 
information between public health authorities of the 
participating countries. 
Introduction
Collecting laboratory-based surveillance data of 
food-borne pathogens, with the aim of detecting and 
responding to multicountry outbreaks, has long been 
established in the European Union (EU). Created in 
1994, Salm-Net was the first European network for 
Salmonella surveillance [1], which was replaced in 
1997 by Enter-net, covering surveillance of Salmonella 
and Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) 
O157, with the addition of Campylobacter in 2004 
[2]. Looking beyond EU borders, the network was 
extended to include experts from the current countries 
of the EU (excluding Croatia), plus Australia, Canada, 
Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa and 
Switzerland [2]. In 2007, Enter-net activities were trans-
ferred to the European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control (ECDC) and the network was renamed the 
Food- and Waterborne Diseases and Zoonoses (FWD) 
network [3]. The network scope was broadened to 
cover six priority diseases: salmonellosis, campylo-
bacteriosis, STEC infections, listeriosis, shigellosis and 
yersiniosis. The network was also extended to encom-
pass Lichtenstein, Turkey and the United States (US). 
Thus, during 2008 to 2013, 38 countries in five conti-
nents were included in the network.
One of the key activities inherited from Enter-net was 
an internationally agreed procedure to share outbreak 
alerts, so-called urgent inquiries (UI), among network 
members. UI are launched by participating countries or 
ECDC after observing an unusual increase in the num-
ber of food- and waterborne infections having poten-
tial for international spread. The main objective of the 
UI is to allow the detection of multicountry outbreaks 
and thereafter facilitate the investigations. While UI 
were communicated initially by fax and email, ECDC 
launched a web-based restricted-access communica-
tion platform, the Epidemic Intelligence Information 
System for FWD (EPIS-FWD) in March 2010, allowing 
nominated participants from public health authorities 
to post and access information in a structured format 
[4,5] (Table 1).
A mean of 5,392 (standard deviation (SD): 173) FWD out-
breaks were reported annually during the study period 
in the EU and European Economic Area (EEA) countries 
[6-11]. About 95% of these outbreaks are point source 
outbreaks, i.e. where exposure happened at only one 
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place, often a result from mishandling of food in restau-
rants or at home and leading to small and localised out-
breaks. Only a small proportion of these outbreaks have 
the potential to affect multiple countries and those are 
the ones that the UI aim to capture. While participation 
in the UI system is voluntary, EU/EEA countries must 
report international or unexpected events to the Early 
Warning and Response System (EWRS) and through the 
International Health Regulations (IHR) [12,13] (Table 1). 
Events for which there is evidence that cases in differ-
ent countries are linked and/or that a food vehicle is 
identified and potentially exported or imported and/
or foreign travellers may have been exposed should be 
reported to the EWRS. Similarly, EU/EEA food authori-
ties should notify the European Commission and other 
food authorities through the Rapid Alert System for 
Food and Feed (RASFF) about serious risks to human 
health deriving from food or feed [14] (Table 1). Since 
2003, yearly reporting of investigated FWD outbreaks 
to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has been 
mandatory for EU/EEA countries [15].
The objective of this study was to describe the UI dur-
ing 2008 to 2013, to measure the performance of the 
UI as an event-based surveillance system to detect 
multicountry outbreaks, and to analyse them in a more 
global EU/EEA surveillance context while looking at 
the link with other reporting systems. In addition, we 
aimed to evaluate the acceptability of the EPIS-FWD as 
a supporting platform.
Methods
We extracted UI details exchanged by fax and email 
and through EPIS-FWD from January 2008 to December 
2013. For each urgent inquiry, we collated the following 
variables on a spreadsheet: disease, pathogen, date of 
launch of the UI and initiating country of the UI, number 
of cases and vehicle of infection. Epidemiological (per-
son, place and time) and microbiological information 
(laboratory results) were used to identify a possible 
multicountry dimension of an outbreak. UI for which dif-
ferent countries reported cases with indistinguishable 
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) pattern, same 
multiple-locus variable-number of tandem-repeats 
analysis (MLVA) profile or similar RNA sequence within 
a defined time period were considered possible mul-
ticountry outbreaks. For rare Salmonella serotypes, 
serotype information was sufficient to define if cases 
might be part of a multicountry outbreak. Vehicles of 
infections were divided in two categories: ‘unknown’ 
and ‘suspected or confirmed’. EU/EEA countries were 
grouped into four geographical regions according 
to the United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs [16]: eastern, northern, southern and 
western Europe (Figure 1). To further define the char-
acteristics of the UI, we collected complementary infor-
mation from peer-reviewed articles, outbreak reports, 
press releases, and ECDC and EFSA reports, by search-
ing on national public health websites, ECDC and EFSA 
websites, PubMed and Google with keywords relevant 
to the disease being studied. We also asked countries 
to update the information in EPIS-FWD. 
The data were analysed with Microsoft Excel 2010 and 
Stata 12.1.   Seasonality was analysed using a five-
month moving average. Significance of the difference 
in proportions was tested using chi-squared test.
We assessed the performance of the UI system through 
the following: the activity of the participating coun-
tries; the threshold for launching UI (number of cases 
triggering the UI); and the capacity of the system to 
detect multicountry outbreaks (percentage of UI that 
were multicountry outbreaks was taken as a proxy 
measure for this). We evaluated the acceptability of the 
EPIS-FWD through the comparison of UI characteristics 
before and after the introduction of the platform. We 
consulted the EWRS and RASFF platforms to identify 
whether UI-associated notifications were issued. As 
this study focuses on EU systems, IHR notifications 
were not included in the analysis.
Table 1
Event-based surveillance systemsa for food- and waterborne diseases in the European Union/European Economic Area
System Coordinating body Role of the systems Participants
Epidemic Intelligence Information 
System for Food- and Waterborne 
Diseases and Zoonoses (EPIS-FWD)
European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control 
(ECDC)
Detection of multicountry food- and 
waterborne diseases outbreaks and 
assessment of the risk
Public health authorities in EU/
EEA countries plus Australia, 
Canada, Iceland, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, South Africa 
and Switzerland
Early Warning and Response 
System (EWRS) European Commission
Risk management of international or  
unexpected events
Public health authorities in EU/
EEA countries
Rapid Alert System for Food and 
Feed (RASFF) European Commission
Risk management of  
serious risk to human health deriving 
from food or feed
Food safety authorities in EU/
EEA countries and specific 
agreements with non-EU/EEA 
countries
EU/EEA: European Union/European Economic Area.
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Results
General characteristics of urgent inquiries
Between January 2008 and December 2013, 215 UI 
were issued by participating countries (Figure 2). The 
number of UI fluctuated over the years, with 32 UI in 
2008, 27 in 2009, 33 in 2010, 49 in 2011, 32 in 2012 
and 42 in 2013.
The moving average highlights some seasonality in the 
northern hemisphere, with peaks during spring and 
summer. One peak in November 2010 did not follow 
this seasonal pattern. In addition, a larger peak was 
visible in the summer and autumn of 2011, with 34 UI 
launched between June and November. 
A total of 20 of 30 EU/EEA countries, four of eight non-
EU/EEA countries and ECDC initiated the UI. Only one 
urgent inquiry was launched by a country from the 
southern hemisphere. Countries in northern and west-
ern Europe launched the majority of the UI, with 117 
(54%) and 54 UIs (25%), respectively (Figure 3). The 
countries from northern and western Europe launched 
respectively 31 and 13 multicountry UI. 
The majority of the UI were posted by the United 
Kingdom (n = 27), France (n = 21) and Denmark (n = 
20). Among the participating non-EU/EEA countries, 
the US posted the most UI (n = 18). One of the UI was 
launched by ECDC on behalf of Israel.
The rate of UI per million inhabitants in EU/EEA coun-
tries shows a pattern, with countries in northern Europe 
posting the most UI, followed in order by countries in 
western, eastern and southern Europe (Figure 4).
Participating countries posted 2,343 messages (initial 
posts and replies, excluding updates), with a median 
of 11 messages per urgent inquiry (range: 1–28). After 
launch of EPIS-FWD in 2010, the number of messages 
posted increased. From 272 and 235 messages in 2008 
and 2009 respectively, the number of messages rose to 
315 in 2010, 582 in 2011, 450 in 2012 and 485 in 2013. 
The mean number of messages per urgent inquiry 
Figure 1
Geographical classification of European Union/European Economic Area countries
Source of the classification: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs [16].
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increased from 2008 to 2012, and decreased in 2013 
(Figure 5).
Pathogens and vehicles of infection
A total of 15 diseases and intoxication syndromes were 
reported (Table 2). Salmonellosis and STEC infection 
represented 63% (n = 135) and 15% (n = 32) of the UI, 
respectively. A total of 50 Salmonella serotypes were 
reported: the two most commonly reported were S. 
Typhimurium (n = 34), including its monophasic vari-
ants 1,4,[5],12:i:-, and S. Enteritidis (n = 22). Seven 
STEC serogroups were reported, of which serogroup 
O157 was the most predominant (n = 20/32). Other 
serogroups reported included O26, O27, O104, O121, 
O145 and O177.
For 110 UI (51%), a food vehicle of infection was either 
suspected or confirmed, through descriptive and/or 
analytical epidemiological studies. This proportion 
was relatively stable between 2008 and 2013 (range: 
36–67%). For 93 UI, the vehicle or origin of infection 
remained unknown. For seven UI, the infection was due 
to direct contact with animals; for four, it was water; 
and for one, it was a laboratory-acquired infection [17].
Three waterborne outbreaks were related to cholera 
in countries outside the EU where European travellers 
were at risk of infection and the remaining outbreak 
was a local outbreak of cryptosporidiosis after contam-
ination of the drinking water.
The most commonly reported food vehicles were veg-
etables (n = 34), followed by pork (n = 14), beef (n = 
12), eggs (n = 7), cereal products (n = 7) and fruit (n = 
7) (Figure 6). A large increase in number of UI related 
to vegetables was observed in 2011, followed by a 
decrease in 2012 and 2013. There were fewer UI related 
to pork in 2012–13 compared with the 2008–11 (except 
2009, when there was no urgent inquiry related to 
pork). 
Affected countries and exposure
Most of the UI (155, 72%) involved a single country, 
meaning that no linked cases could be identified by 
ECDC in other countries. The mean number of coun-
try involved in multicountry UI was four (SD: 2; range: 
2–14). Of the 60 multicountry UI, 50 involved between 
two and four countries. In 10 UI, at least five countries 
were involved per urgent inquiry, including an out-
break of S. Stanley infections in the EU in 2012 [18] and 
hepatitis A associated with travel to Egypt in 2013 [19]. 
Multicountry outbreaks were primarily due to the distri-
bution of a contaminated product to multiple countries 
(35 outbreaks) and to the travel of people to a common 
country/place of infection (19 outbreaks). International 
trade of infected animals was reported in two UI. For 
Figure 2
Number of urgent inquiries and five-month moving average, by month, participating countries of the northern hemispherea, 
2008–13 (n = 214)
a Current countries of the European Union/European Economic Area (excluding Croatia), plus Canada, Japan, Switzerland, Turkey and the 
United States.
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four UI, the information available was insufficient to 
define the exposure.
A total of 31/117 (26%) of the UI launched by coun-
tries in northern Europe were multicountry outbreaks 
(Figure 3). A similar proportion of multicountry out-
breaks was observed among countries of western 
Europe (13/54) and non-EU/EEA countries (5/21). For 
countries in southern and eastern Europe, numbers of 
UI were too small to obtain a meaningful comparisons 
for these regions. No region was, however, statisti-
cally significantly more likely to launch UI that became 
multicountry.
Number of cases triggering an urgent inquiry
For 76 UI (35%), the trigger for posting the UI was less 
than 10 human cases and for 19 UI (9%) the trigger 
was above 100 cases (median: 15; range: 0–8,138). 
Six UI were launched after identification of a contami-
nated food product, without any human cases initially 
reported. The UI launched with the highest number of 
cases (8,138 cases) was related to a large outbreak of 
cholera in Haiti in 2010 and can be considered as an 
outlier [20].
Of the 76 UI with a trigger below 10 cases, 42 and 
16 were posted by countries in northern and western 
Europe, respectively.
The median number of cases triggering the UI 
decreased over the years: 29; range 3–1,375 (in 2008), 
18; range: 0–600 (2009), 20; range: 2–8,138 (2010), 
9; range 0–250 (2011), 12; range 1–267 (2012) and 11; 
range 0–391 (2013). A total of 19 UI with a trigger below 
10 cases and 6/19 UI with a trigger above 100 cases 
appeared to be multicountry outbreaks. The mean 
number of cases triggering UI differed by disease; for 
instance, for listeriosis, salmonellosis and STEC infec-
tion, respectively, the mean was 14 (SD: 16), 59 (SD: 
170) and 21 (SD: 46). 
No statistically significant associations were observed 
between the geographical regions, the number of cases 
triggering the UI and the multicountry aspect of the UI.
Links with other alert systems
For 41 UI, an EWRS was launched: 26 UI were launched 
before an EWRS message was issued, eight were 
posted after an EWRS message was issued and seven 
were posted the same day. For the last two situations, 
the UI were used to collect epidemiological and micro-
biological information to assess the situation better, 
but implied that information was scattered between 
the two platforms.
For 26 of the 60 multicountry outbreaks, an EWRS 
message was launched. Between 2008 and 2013, 
105 EWRS messages were issued about FWD events, 
among which 36 were multicountry events. The major-
ity of the EWRS messages on FWD related to salmonel-
losis (n = 29), botulism (n = 13) and hepatitis A (n = 13). 
A total of 44 (42%) and 56 (53%) of those 105 EWRS 
messages reported the risk of a contaminated food 
product potentially distributed internationally and the 
risk of travellers getting infected while abroad (includ-
ing infection on cruise ships), respectively. Among the 
64 EWRS on FWD events that were not reported as UI, 
two salmonellosis outbreaks could potentially have 
been investigated first through UI: one reported by 
the European Commission on behalf of Switzerland in 
2008 and one outbreak connected to campsites and 
restaurants in southern Sweden in 2010.
For 46 UI, at least one RASFF notification was issued. 
For 14 of the 27 UI that involved at least one EU/EEA 
country, were linked to the distribution of a contami-
nated product and for which a vehicle of infection was 
suspected or confirmed, a RASFF notification was 
issued. For 22 events, the UI were launched first; for 
20 events, the RASFF notification was launched first; 
and for four events, they were launched the same day.
Discussion
Key performance of urgent inquiries
With a mean of three UI per month (SD: 2) between 
2008 and 2013, an increasing number of messages 
exchanged, and a decreasing median number of cases 
triggering the UI, the UI are a well-established system 
that is increasingly trusted by the participating coun-
tries. More information is shared and outbreaks are 
likely to be reported at an earlier stage. Since 2010, 
EPIS-FWD has facilitated the exchange of information.
Figure 3
Single country and multicountry urgent inquiries initiated 
by participating countriesa and the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control, 2008–13 (n = 215)
ECDC: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; EU/
EEA: European Union/European Economic Area.
a Current countries of the EU/EEA (excluding Croatia), plus 
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, Switzerland, 
Turkey and the United States. Geographical classification of EU/
EEA countries according to the categories of the United Nations, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs [16].
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
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Number of urgent inquiries
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The number of messages exchanged among participat-
ing countries did not seem to be an indicator for hav-
ing multicountry outbreaks. The majority of the replies 
to UI were to report negative findings and/or provide 
background information useful for the investigations
Looking at the moving average (Figure 2), two main 
peaks in number of UI were observed: the first in 
November 2010 is unexplained; for the peak observed 
from June to November 2011, it is possible that follow-
ing media attention on the outbreak of STEC O104:H4 
infection in Germany in 2011, network members 
increased the sensitivity of their surveillance systems 
and decreased the threshold to launch UI.
UI are slightly marked by the seasons. While outbreaks 
related to mishandling of food (home or restaurant) 
are quite affected by the seasons – with faster growth 
of microorganisms in warmer temperatures and inad-
equate cooking or contamination of food at barbeques 
or parties – outbreaks related to distribution of con-
taminated commercial food items are likely to be less 
affected by the seasons, but rather by breach of con-
tamination barriers in the production chain, resulting 
in less marked seasonal patterns.
A total of 10 EU/EEA countries did not launch any UI 
during the study period. Considering the difference 
in number and rate of UI launched by participating 
countries, the threshold to launch UI appears to be 
extremely variable, with the countries in northern and 
western Europe having the lowest threshold for posting 
an UI. This is confirmed by the fact that the majority of 
the UI triggered by less than 10 cases were launched 
by countries of these two regions. Considering the 
absence of association between the region and 
Figure 4
Rate of urgent inquiries per million inhabitants in European Union/European Economic Area countries, 2008–13 (n = 215)
Divided by quantile. Source of population estimates: Eurostat 2011 [22].
Geographical classification of European Union/European Economic Area countries according to the categories of the United Nations, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs [16].
Rate of urgent inquiries
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multicountry aspect of the UI, it is suspected that out-
breaks, including multicountry outbreaks, were under-
reported in countries of eastern and southern Europe. 
The UI system is dependent on the capacity and will-
ingness of participating countries to launch and reply 
to an UI. While the focus of the UI is to detect multi-
country outbreaks, the majority of the UI involved one 
single country. It was not possible to identify the crite-
ria that make UI become multicountry investigations. 
The threshold number of cases to launch UI differed 
with the reported disease, with UI for listeriosis and 
STEC infections having a lower threshold than, for 
instance, salmonellosis. This could be explained by the 
relative severity of the diseases. 
Two thirds of the multicountry outbreaks were due to 
the distribution of a contaminated product and one 
third were related to travel to one country or place 
of infection. Multicountry waterborne outbreaks are 
likely to be travel related. For both distribution of con-
taminated products and travel-related outbreaks, it is 
through the gathering and cross-matching of informa-
tion that the multicountry dimension of an outbreak 
can be identified. As there was no association between 
number of cases as a threshold of UI and being a mul-
ticountry outbreak, all clusters/outbreaks with poten-
tial international spread should be reported, even if 
detected at a late stage.
The reasons for the striking variations in UI report-
ing are unclear. Structural and cultural differences in 
the organisation of national public health systems are 
possible explanations. There are striking variations 
between countries with respect to their surveillance 
systems, including their laboratory capacity for detec-
tion, identification and typing of gastrointestinal path-
ogens. Some countries, therefore, have very limited 
capacity to detect and investigate outbreak signals 
[21]. Considering the important variation in the number 
of UI launched per countries and the number of their 
replies, ECDC should further encourage all countries to 
participate actively in the system. Negative responses 
are also of practical value to a national outbreak con-
trol team, as they actively confirm that other countries 
have not detected associated cases.
The active participation of non-EU/EEA countries con-
firms the perceived added value of the UI. While not 
part of the network, Israel used the UI through ECDC to 
investigate a national outbreak in 2011. Such requests 
from countries outside the network should be evalu-
ated and, as much as possible, facilitated by ECDC.
Representativeness of urgent inquiries 
regarding outbreaks occurring in the European 
Union/European Economic Area
The majority of the outbreaks reported to EFSA during 
the study period were caused by Salmonella spp. [6-11] 
and similarly Salmonella was the leading pathogen for 
which UI were launched. This was expected, as labora-
tories commonly test for and report this pathogen, and 
serotyping and molecular typing can be very effective 
Table 2
Urgent inquiries launched per disease or intoxication 
syndrome, participating countriesa, 2008–13 (n = 215)
Disease or intoxication syndrome
Number 
of urgent 
inquiries
Salmonellosis 135
Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli infection 32
Listeriosis 11
Shigellosis 7
Hepatitis A 7
Cryptosporidiosis 5
Norovirus infection 4
Cholera 3
Botulism 3
Food poisoning due to toxins 2
Yersiniosis 2
Trichinellosis 1
Paratyphoid fever 1
Cyclosporiasis 1
Brucellosis 1
Total 215
a  Current countries of the European Union/European Economic 
Area (excluding Croatia), plus Australia, Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey and the United 
States.
Figure 5
Mean number of messagesa per urgent inquiry per year, 
participating countriesb, 2008–13
a Comprises initial posts and replies, excluding updates.
b Current countries of the EU/EEA (excluding Croatia), plus 
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, Switzerland, 
Turkey and the United States.
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in detecting case clusters. Salmonella has a propensity 
to cause both point source and persistent source out-
breaks, the latter being potentially cross-border out-
breaks through food or animal trade. STEC and Listeria 
were the number two and three pathogens reported in 
UI, respectively, while outbreaks caused by these path-
ogens were least often reported to EFSA. STEC infection 
and Listeria outbreaks were infrequent in comparison 
with Salmonella outbreaks; however, the seriousness 
of the diseases, coupled with the availability of dis-
criminative molecular typing methods mean that they 
are more likely to be reported.
UI may be particularly valuable for Listeria outbreaks 
because the disease does not have a high attack rate 
and listeriosis outbreaks are frequently due to con-
sumption of manufactured products potentially dis-
tributed internationally (e.g. cheese, fish) rather than 
mishandling of food in restaurants or households as 
for Salmonella. Therefore, dispersed outbreaks are 
much more likely to be detected through the pooling of 
case information at the EU/EEA level [5].
While campylobacteriosis was the most commonly 
reported food-borne disease in the EU/EEA during the 
study period (mean: 212,987 cases (SD: 11,916); 471 
outbreaks (SD: 89) [6-11], no UI were launched during 
the period studied. Campylobacter samples are not 
subtyped routinely and no discriminative and reliable 
subtyping system exists so dispersed, continuous out-
breaks are therefore unlikely to be detected.
Whereas vegetables were the predominant vehicles of 
infection reported in the UI, eggs were the main food 
vehicle category reported to EFSA [6-11], representing 
up to 18.5% of the outbreaks in 2013 [10]. One hypoth-
esis is that eggs are more likely to be associated with 
point source outbreaks, such as in households or res-
taurants. It should be noted that the proportion of out-
breaks due to vegetables reported to EFSA increased, 
from 1.9% in 2008 to 4.4% in 2013 (with a peak of 
8.7% in 2010) [6-11]. The outbreak of STEC infection 
in Germany in 2011 potentially encouraged countries 
to report outbreaks linked to vegetables, which might 
explain the increase in number of vegetable-related UI 
that year. No explanation was identified for the peak 
in 2010.
Links with other event-based surveillance 
systems
Despite the existence of criteria for mandatory notifi-
cations, outbreaks reported as UI were inconsistently 
notified through EWRS and RASFF. This does not imply, 
however, that appropriate measures were not effec-
tively implemented. All EWRS contact points have 
access to EPIS-FWD so that public health risk manag-
ers are kept informed. 
ECDC, together with the European Commission, should 
develop guidance for reporting in the various exist-
ing risk assessment (EPIS-FWD) and risk management 
(EWRS and RASFF) platforms and should be more pro-
active in ensuring that EU/EEA countries report appro-
priately to these platforms. No RASFF notifications 
were issued for half of the UI that involved at least one 
EU/EEA country and were linked to the distribution of a 
contaminated product and for which a vehicle of infec-
tion was suspected or confirmed. A possible explana-
tion for the lack of RASFF notification is that for these 
UI, a vehicle was suspected but no specific product or 
brand could be identified.
Despite a new version of EPIS-FWD, launched in July 
2013, allowing any expert to be granted access to spe-
cific UI, food safety authorities still do not have default 
access to the platform. In the future, providing food 
safety authorities access to EPIS-FWD and creating an 
IT connection between EPIS-FWD and EWRS, and even-
tually RASFF, could be foreseen in order to streamline 
the exchange of information and ensure constant inter-
action between risk assessment and risk management. 
In 2013, as ECDC established a molecular typing sur-
veillance system for Salmonella, Listeria and STEC, a 
new version of EPIS-FWD was launched, integrating the 
management of clusters detected through molecular 
surveillance. With the development of molecular typ-
ing methods and their use in EU/EEA countries, ECDC 
will detect more and more multicountry microbiological 
Figure 6
Urgent inquiries by categories of food vehicle of infection, 
participating countriesa, 2008–13 (n = 110)
a Current countries of the European Union/European Economic Area 
(excluding Croatia), plus Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, 
South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States.
b Cereal products includes rice and seeds/pulses.
c Other food categories include crustaceans, shellfish, molluscs, 
herbs and spices, mixed or buffet meals, canned food products, 
turkey meat, sweets and chocolate, infant formula, pet food, 
dietary supplements and other or unspecified poultry meat.
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clusters. Microbiological clusters considered to be 
relevant will be the trigger for ECDC to launch UI and 
therefore the number of UI is expected to rise in the 
coming years.
Conclusion
The UI proved to be successful in facilitating the detec-
tion of multicountry FWD outbreaks and became a key 
element of event-based surveillance of FWD outbreaks 
in the EU/EEA.
The introduction of the EPIS-FWD platform in 2010 has 
strengthened the role of the FWD network in facilitating 
the timely exchange of information between countries. 
Combined with data collected by EFSA on outbreaks, 
the UI give a good overview of the characteristics of 
FWD outbreaks reported at the EU/EEA level.
Our analysis shows the need to strengthen coordina-
tion between the risk assessors and risk managers at 
the EU/EEA level, particularly when reporting events to 
EPIS-FWD, EWRS and RASFF. This could be supported 
through the development of cross-sectoral guidelines 
for outbreak reporting.
As it was not possible to define any criteria that iden-
tify which events reported as UI would become multi-
country outbreaks, guidelines for posting an UI should 
not be restrictive and participating countries should be 
encouraged to post an UI as soon as they detect any 
unusual FWD event.
Additional studies should be conducted in order to 
further assess the capacity of UI to detect multicoun-
try outbreaks and to evaluate the impact of UI on the 
geographical spread of outbreaks and the resolution of 
outbreak sources.
*Authors’ correction
On request of the authors, two experts from Bulgaria were 
added to the list of members of the European Food and 
Waterborne Diseases Study Group. This change was made 
on 8 July 2015.
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